

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 088820

R 021657Z DEC 76
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3790
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 20359

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: TECH, PARM, GW
SUBJ: SOME GERMAN THINKING ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE
GERMAN-BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM.

REF: (A) BONN 20120; (B) MCCLELLAND/NOSENZO LETTER,
DATED OCTOBER 26.

1. SUMMARY: ROUGET, IN CHARGE OF NUCLEAR AFFAIRS IN
FONOFF, THINKS THERE IS ROOM FOR FLEXIBILITY IN DEALING
WITH THE FRG/BRAZILIAN AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE
DIFFICULT TO CANCEL ACCORD ITSELF. HE SCOUTED
POSSIBLE LOW-KEY DISCUSSIONS OF ISSUES IN CUSTOMARY
US/FRG NPT CHANNELS IN ORDER TO AVOID POLITICAL CON-
FRONTATION. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING A LENGTHY DISCUSSION AT A SOCIAL OCCASION
ON NOVEMBER 30, ROUGET, CHIEF OF THE SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGY DIVISION IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE, DISCUSSED HOW
TO AVOID POSSIBLE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE NEW CARTER
ADMINISTRATION AND THE FRG WITH RESPECT TO THE GERMAN/
BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL. WHAT HE HAD TO SAY PARALLELED
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RATHER CLOSELY PARAGRAPH 5 OF REFTEL A.

3. ROUGET CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS GERMAN POLICY TO GIVE THE MATTER UNDRAMATIC, LOW-KEY ATTENTION. HE EXPLAINED HOW HARD IT WOULD BE FOR FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER TO CANCEL THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT WHICH UNDERLAY THE GERMAN DEAL WITH BRAZIL. BASED ON HIS EXPERIENCE WITH THE AGREEMENT, NEVERTHELESS, HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE US CONCERN WITHOUT FORMALLY TAMPERING WITH THE AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT WE COULD DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM BY DISCUSSING "FLEXIBILITY" IN IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT RATHER THAN BY TOUCHING THE LEGAL CONTRACT.

4. ROUGET THOUGHT IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE AVOID A HIGH-LEVEL CONFRONTATION ON THE MATTER. HE ALSO THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE ISSUE NOT BE TREATED AS AN OCCASION FOR A DIPLOMATIC VICTORY BY ONE OR THE OTHER INTERESTED PARTY. ROUGET POINTED OUT THAT WE COULD NOT DEAL WITH BRAZIL IN THE SAME FASHION AS WITH PAKISTAN AND SOUTH KOREA. WE HAD TO KEEP IN MIND THAT BRAZIL WAS A VERY IMPORTANT COUNTRY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THAT LATIN AMERICANS WERE BY NATURE EXCEEDINGLY PROUD. ROUGET SUGGESTED THAT THE BEST APPROACH WOULD BE A BILATERAL EXPLORATION OF FLEXIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTATION, WHICH COULD BE ACHIEVED BY LOW-KEY CONSULTATION BETWEEN GERMAN AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS WHO REGULARLY DISCUSS NUCLEAR PROBLEMS WITH EACH OTHER. HE ALSO MENTIONED, WITHOUT EXPLAINING FURTHER, THE POSSIBILITY OF A REGIONALIZATION OF THE REPROCESSING OR ENRICHMENT FACILITIES.

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5. ROUGET ALSO SAID THAT U.S. AND GERMAN OFFICIALS WILL HAVE TO DECIDE AS TO WHEN THE BRAZILIANS THEMSELVES WOULD BE BROUGHT INTO DISCUSSIONS.

6. COMMENT: ROUGET IS BY NATURE A CAREFUL OFFICIAL, WHO, NEVERTHELESS, HAS FRANKLY SHARED WITH US IN THE PAST HIS PRELIMINARY THINKING ON PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL CONCERN. IN SOME CASES (I.E. BORSIG), THESE "PERSONAL" VIEWS FAILED TO STAND THE TEST OF TIME AND HIGHER-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE FRG MINISTRIES. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HIS REMARKS REFLECT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION, AND THAT THE APPROACH HE OUTLINED ABOVE REPRESENTS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS OF THE FRG FOREIGN OFFICE. THE MINISTRIES OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, AND FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY WILL ALSO PLAY KEY ROLES IN DETERMINING THE FINAL POSITION OF THE FRG GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE.

7. AS NOTED IN REF B, THE FRG FEELS ITSELF FIRMLY OBLIGATED BY AN AGREEMENT (BONN 10706, 1975), AN INSTRUMENT (BONN 10770, 1975), FIVE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

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ANNEXES (BONN 10938, 1975), AND A NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTS (BONN 01237). OUR INFORMATION ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE ANNEXES AND CONTRACTS IS LIMITED BUT, AS NOTED IN REF B, THE SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM DIFFERS FROM PROJECT-TO-PROJECT WITH TRANSFER OF REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY CURRENTLY LIMITED TO EXCHANGE OF "SOFTWARE." WE ASSUME, ACCORDINGLY, THAT THESE DIFFERENCES IN THE TIME TABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION REPRESENT THE FLEXIBILITY THAT ROUGET HAS IN MIND. WE ARE CONFIDENT THE FRG IS INTERESTED IN AVOIDING AN OPEN, SERIOUS CONFRONTATION WITH THE US ON THIS MATTER. WE SUGGEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDER LOW-KEY BILATERAL US/FRG DISCUSSIONS ABOUT FLEXIBILITY (I.E. APPROPRIATE DELAYS) IN IMPLEMENTING THE TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE GERMAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO BRAZIL AS THE FIRST STEP IN NEGOTIATION OF AN ACCEPTABLE SOLU-

TION TO THIS PROBLEM.

STOESSEL.

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